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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

YV. P. HARLIN CONSTRUCTION

COMPANY.

vs.

TIIE CONTINENTAL BANK &
TRUST COl\iIP ANY,
Cross Claimant and Respondent,

Case No
12180

VS.

GEORGE STANLEY,

Appellant,

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
Cross-claim by Continental Bank and Trust Company against George Stanley to recover sum paid on
check.
1

DISPOSITION IN LO,VER COURT
George Stanley's motion to vacate the bank's judgment on its cross-claim upon the ground that the court
had no jurisdiction of the subject matter and the person
was denied.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
George Stanley seeks an order directing the district
court to grant his motion to vacate the bank's judgment
against him.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This case arises out of the case of W. P. Harlin
v. Continental Bank and Trust Company previously
considered by the Court, 23 Utah 2d 422, 464 P2d 585.
The Court affirmed the judgment in favor of Harlin
and against the bank, Stanley Title Company and
George Stanley and in favor of the bank and against
Stanley Title Company and George Stanley on the
bank's cross-claim.
On February 26, 1970, the bank on ex parte application and without notice to George Stanley obtained
a judgment of the District Court for $11,082.60 against
the Stanley Title Company and George Stanley personally on its cross-claim. (R.652)
2

The cross-claim alleges as fallows :
"As a cross claim against defendant Stanley Title
Company, defendant, The Continental Bank and Trust
Company alleges:
1. On or about September 6, 1966, the proceeds of

the check, a copy of which is identified as Exhibit A
to the complaint, were paid by this defendant to defendant Stanley Title Company.
2. Plaintiff claims said proceeds were wrongfulJy

paid by this defendant to the defendant Stanley Title
Company.
3. If plaintiff recovers judgment against The Con-

tinental Bank and Trust Company by reason of such
payment, Stanley Title Company has been unjustly
enriched thereby and The Continental Bank and Trust
Company is entitled to recover the amount of any judgment by plaintiff against it from defendant Stanley
Title Company.
\VHEREFORE, The Continental Bank and
Trust Company prays:
1. That plaintiff take nothing by its complaint.
2. That if plaintiff recover judgment against it,

The Continental Bank and Trust Company have judgment against Stanley Title Company in such amount
as the court may award plaintiff against The Continental Bank and Trust Company.
3. For its costs in this action and such other relief as

3

the court may deem appropriate in the circumstances."

(R.19)

An answer to the cross-claim was filed by Stanley
Title Company ( R.53) . No answer was filed by George
Stanley because he was not named as a cross-defendant.
The cross-claim was never amended. George Stanley was not a party and, of course, was not served with
summons.
On April 20, 1970, George Stanley appearing
specially filed a motion in the district court to vacate
the judgment upon the ground that the court had no
jurisdiction on the subject matter or the person. (R.669)
This motion was granted on May 21, 1970, (R.676).
Thereafter the bank moved for reconsideration of the
order granting the motion ( R.673) and on June 22,
1970, the district court made an order setting aside and
vacating the order dated May 21, 1970, and reinstating
the judgment of February 26, 1970, in favor of the
bank and against George Stanley (R.683). This appeal
is from such order.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
I. A cross-claim constitutes the assertion of an

alleged distinct and separate cause of action.
2. The judgment is void because the court had no

jurisdiction of the subject matter and the person.
4

3. A void judgment may be set aside on motion
at any time.
-l!. The order of the court reinstating the judgment

is void.

ARGUMENT
1. A CROSS-CLAIM CONSTITUTES THE

ASSERTION OF AN ALLEGED DISTINCT
AND SEPARATE CAUSE OF ACTION.
Rule 13 (f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure permits the filing of a cross-claim to assert a claim by one
party against a co-party. The rule is substantially the
same as sectoin 104-9-7, Utah Code Annotated, 1943,
and Federal rule 13 (g).
A cross-claim (referred to in section 104-9-7, Utah
Code Annotated, 1943, as a cross-complaint) initiates
a separate and distinct cause of action.
In the case of Alexander v. Superior Court, 170
C.A.2d 54, 338 P2d 502, the court said:
"A cross complaint constitutes an assertion of an
alleged distinct and independent cause of action
and when one is properly interposed there are
two sumultaneous actions pending in the latter of
which the defendant in the original action becomes a plaintiff who must by his cross complaint
allege facts which give him the right to maintain
his action. Case v. Kadota Fig Assn. 35 Cal2d
596,603, 220 P2 912, Pacific Finance Corp. v.
Superior Court, 219 Cal. 179, 182, 25 P2d 983,
90 AL.R.384."
5

A cross-claim must contain all essential allegations and should be pleaded as fully as the original cause
of action and should be sufficient in itself without recourse to other pleadings.

Lakey v. Caldwell, 72 Idaho 52, 237 P2d 610.
Key v. Clements, 133, Mont. 344, 323 P2d 603.
In this case the defendant bank filed a cross-claim,
set out in full above, but did not name George Stanley
as a cross-defendant. The only cross-claim pleaded was
against the Stanley Title Company.
This Court held in the case of West v. Shurtliff,
28 Utah 337, 79 P. 180, that in order to obtain a
judgment against a cross-defendant a defendant must
file a cross-complaint demanding relief and make proper
service.
As indicated above, there is no cross pleading
against George Stanley personally and of course no
service.
2. THE JUDGMENT IS VOID BECAUSE
THE COURT HAD NO JURISDICTION OF
THE SUBJECT MATTER AND THE PERSON.
It is basic law that a court must have jurisdiction
of the subject matter and of the person of the party
against whom the judgment is rendered.

The rule is clearly stated in American J urisprudence.
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"It is essential to the proper rendition of a judgment that the court have jurisdiction of the subject matter. A judgment rendered without jurisdiction of the subject matter is void. The operation of the rule is not affected by any judicial discretion possessed by the Court. In order to confer jurisdiction on a court to render judgment,
the subject must be presented for its consideration in some mode sanctioned by law." 46 Am.
J ur. 2d sec. 24 pp. 329, 330.
"It is essential to the proper rendition of a judgment in personam that the court have jurisdiction
of the parties, even though such parties have
knowledge, as distinguished from notice, of the
action and indeed even though they are present at
the trial. ... A personal judgment rendered without such jurisdiction is in violation of the due
process clause of the United States Constitution,
and is not merely voidable, but is void." 46 Am.
J ur. 2d, section 25, p. 330.

To the same effect see Freeman
5th Edition, section 226; 49. C.J.S. pp.
JV est v. Shurtliff, 28 Utah at p. 344. In
17 Utah 412, 425, 53 P. 1003; Cooke v.
371, 428; 248 p. 83.

on Judgments,
45-49. See also
re Christiansen,
Cooke, 67 Utah

In the case of West v. Shurtliff this Court said:
"The main question for the court to determine
upon this appeal is whether the nisi prius court in
the original case had jurisdiction under the pleadings to render judgment in favor of defendant
Larsen against his co-defendant, Shurtliff, the
said defendant Larsen not having filed nor served
any cross-complaint, nor filed any pleading in the
case asking for affirmative relief, but, on the con-
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trary, only having filed an answer duly verified,
disclaiming any interest in the notes or mortgage
in question, and demanding to be d1sm1ssed w1th
his costs. Section
4 of our Revised Statutes ot
1898 provides that: '\Vhen a defendant has a
cause of action affecting the subject matter of the
action against a co-defendant, he may, in the
same action, file a cross-complamt against the codef endant. The defendant thereto may be served
as in other cases, and defense thereto shall be
made in the manner prescribed in the original
complaint.' Under the above provisions, in order
to have obtained a judgment m his favor against
respondent, defendant, Larsen should have filed
a cross-complaint or demanded aftinnative relief,
making proper service. A number of authorities
have been cited by the learned counsel for the appellant relative to the power of courts to establish
and determine the respective interests of each
party to the suit; but the authorities almost uniformly hold that a decree between codefendants
can only be based upon the pleadings and proof.
Black on Judgments, section 184, we think, states
the correct rule as follows. 'It is not enough that
the parties are properly in court. That does not
give the tribunal power to adjudicate any and all
matters of difference between them. \Vhen we
speak of jurisdiction of the subject-matter, we do
not mean merely cognizance of the general class
of actions to which the action in question belongs,
but we also mean legal power to pass upon and
decide the particular contention which the judgment assumes to settle, and how can a court acquire jurisdiction of the particular contention
except it be clearly marked out and precisely defined by the pleadings of the parties? And how
can that be done in any mode known to the law
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save by the formation of a regular issue? There is
therefore plausible grounds for holding that, if
the record fails to show an issue to be determined,
the judgment will be void on its face.' Persons by
becoming suitors do not place themselves for all
purposes under the control of the court. It is only
over those particular interests which they choose
to bring in issue by proper pleadings that the
power of jurisdiction arises."
In this case like in the West case there was no
cross-claim against George Stanley which would invoke
the jurisdiction of the court. He was not served with
summons. The fact that he was personally present at
the trial of the main case did not subject him to the
court's jurisdiction.

Lee v. School District, 149 Iowa 345, 128 N.W.
533.
The judgment for $11,082.60 was rendered against
George Stanley on ex parte application without notice
and under the rules and cases discussed above it was
clearly void.
3. A VOID JUDGMENT lVIAY BE SET
ASIDE ON MOTION AT ANY TIME.
Courts have inherent power to vacate their own
judgments. 49 C.J.S. 478.
The rule is well settled that a judgment, void on
its face, may be vacated on motion at any time.
49 C.J.S. sec. 267, pp. 480-482Los Angeles v.
Moryan, 105 C.A.2d 726, 234 P2d 319
9

Michels v. Clemens, 140 Colo 82, 342 P2d 693
Meek v. Ames, 177 Kan. 565, 280 P2d 957
Laurer v. Eighth Dist. Ct., 62 Nev. 78, 140 P2d
953
Preston v. Denkins, 94 Ariz. 214, 382 P2d 686
Heckathorn v. Heckethorn, 77
369, 423
P2d 410
Hughes v. Aetna, 234 Or. 426, 383 P2d 55
A judgment is void on its face when the judgment
roll affirmatively shows that the trial court lacked
either jurisdiction of the person or jurisdiction over the
subject matter or judicial power to render the particular
judgment.

Town of Watonga v. Crane Co., 189 Okl 184, 114
P2d 941
Caraway v. Overholser, 182 Okl 357, 77 P2d 688
In this case the record shows that George Stanley
was not named as a cross-defendant in the cross-claim
so it affirmatively shows on the record that the judgment of February 26, 1970, was void on its face. The
motion to vacate it was therefore timely filed.
4. THE ORDER OF THE COURT REINSTATING THE JUDGMENT IS VOID.
As indicated in the statement of facts, George
Stanley made a motion to vacate the judgment dated
February 26, 1970, (R.669) and the motion was granted (R.676). Thereafter the bank filed a motion to reconsider the motion to vacate ( R.673) .
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The court heard the motion, made a written decision
concluding that it was in error without stating any
reasons ( R.677) and made an order reinstating the
judgment dated February 26, 1970 (R.683).
It has long been the law in this state and elsewhere
that the manner in which a court decision may be reviewed are prescribed by statute and the courts are
not at liberty to substitute other procedures in their
place.

Luke v. Coleman, 38 Utah 383, 113 P. 1023
See citations of many cases from other states, 38
Utah at p. 387.
Drury v. Lunceford, 18 Utah 2d 74, 415 P2d 662
Utah Sand and Gravel v. Tolbert, 16 Utah 2d,
407, 402 P2d 703
In the Luke case the district court denied the plaintiff's motion for a new trial and thereafter the plaintiff
"petitioned and moved the court to grant a rehearing
and reargument of the plaintiff's motion, This Court
said:
"':Ve think the district court had not the power to
entertain such a motion. It is unknown to our
practice."
See also Hanson v. Hanson, 3 Cal. Unrep. 66, 20
P. 736, in which the trial court reconsidered an order,
as in this case, setting aside a void judgment. The court
said:
"The court, therefore, had power to make an
order setting aside the decree; and such order was
11

made after hearing and consideration. This being the case, the court had no power to vacate it
because subsequent reflection had induced it to
believe that it was erroneous. Litigation must
have some end."
Neither the statutes nor the Rules of Civil Procedure authorized the court to entertain a motion to
reconsider its order vacating the judgment. The court
was, therefore, without power to make an order reinstating the judgment dated February 26, 1970.

CONCLUSION
The trial court did not have jurisdiction of George
Stanley on the cross-claim nor of the subject matter
because George Stanley was not named as a crossdef endant and there was no issue by any pleading which
invoked the jurisdiction of the court. There was no
service of summons on George Stanley in the distinct
and separate cause instituted by filing the cross-claim.
The judgment of February 26, 1970, on ex parte
application was, therefore, void, not merely voidable.
The trial Court properly granted the appellant's motion, on special appearance, to vacate the judgment, but
erred in reconsidering its order and reversing its
decision.
Respectfully submitted,

SKEEN AND SKEEN
E. J. Skeen

Attorneys for Appellant
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